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ERUPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EMERGING VOLCANIC ISLANDS AND THE
LAW OF TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION
Volcanic activity on the bottom of the ocean between November 1963
and June 1967 created the island of Surtsey off the southwest coast of
Iceland.' In September 1973, Japan acquired a new islet formed by
volcanic eruptions in the Bonins 580 miles south of Tokyo.2 More recent:
ly controversy threatens to arise between the United States and Japan
over new islands being formed by undersea volcanic activities in the
South Pacific. 3 Two shoals, one discovered by a Japanese fishing boat in
1974, and the other discovered by the United States in 1976, are expected
to become islands in the Mariana group. The shoals lie midway between
Uracus Island, a strategic trust territory under the administration of the
United States, and Minami Iwo Jima, an island belonging to Japan.
Prior to the 20th century, uninhabited islands in the Pacific Ocean
assumed little importance. Today, however, their value as strategic bases
for air and naval forces is increasingly being recognized. In addition, as
more nations extend the limits of their territorial sea to a distance of 200
miles,4 the importance of these emerging islands as a means of controlling
large areas of international waters, and the fishing and mineral resources
within those waters, cannot be underestimated. 5
i. See Kane, Surtsey: An Island Emerges, 76 NAT. HIsT. 22-27 (1967); Shuldiner, Fiery
Birth of a New Island: Surtsey, POPULAR SCI., Oct. 1965, at 92-93; Thorarinsson, Surtsey:
Island Born of Fire, 127 NAT'L GEOG. MAG. 712-26 (1965); Surtsey, Child of an Expanding
Earth?, SATURDAY REV., July 3, 1965, at 33-39.
2. Cleveland Plain Dealer, Nov. 21, 1976, § 1, at 12, col. 2.
3. Id.
4. The United States extended its seaward control to the 200 mile limit as of March 1,
1977. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101, 90
Stat. 33 (1976) (to be codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1811). At least nine other countries have
extended their sovereignty over seas adjacent to their coasts to a distance of 200 nautical
miles. Several additional countries have extended their jurisdiction over fishing rights
beyond the traditional 12 mile limit. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INFORMATION ON
UNITED STATES OCEAN INTERESTS TOGETHER WITH POSITIONS AND RESULTS OF LAW OF SEA
CONFERENCE AT CARACAS 1, 2 (1975). See also K. H.iERTONSSON, THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA
20-38 (1973).
5. Although international waters have long been valuable as fishing grounds, the newly
discovered mineral wealth on the ocean floor has greatly increased the value of these
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This Note will examine the international law of territorial acquisition
and the application of the principle of discovery-occupation to new ter-
ritories formed by geologic activity. The shortcomings of this traditional
principle will be highlighted, and an alternative approach suggested for
the resolution of disputes over the sovereignty of emerging volcanic
islands.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCOVERY-OCCUPATION
Territorial sovereignty is the authority of a state to control territory and
to rule over the persons and objects present therein. 6 Of the five tradition-
ally recognized modes by which territorial sovereignty can be acquired, 7
occupation is the means of establishing sovereignty over land not under
the authority of any state. When applied to newly discovered territory, it
is commonly referred to as the principle of discovery-occupation.8
The origin of the principle of discovery-occupation can be traced to the
age of European colonialism in the 15th and 16th centuries. Prior to that
time, the feudal states of Europe were organized on the presupposition
that land could be acquired only if it could be effectively governed by a
feudal lord.9 The discoveries of the great explorers in the 15th and 16th
waters. It has been estimated that deposits of copper, manganese, nickel, and other miner-
als, primarily in the form of deep sea nodules, are present in sufficient quantities to satisfy
mankind's needs for thousands of years. Wertenbaker, Mining the Wealth of the Ocean
Deep, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1977, § 6 (Magazine), at 14, col. I.
6. Territorial sovereignty was defined by Max Huber, arbitrator in the Island of Palmas
arbitration, in these terms: "Sovereignty in the relation between states signifies indepen-
dence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the
exclusion of any other State, the functions of a State." Island of Palmas (United States v.
Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
829 (1949).
7. The four other means of acquiring territory are: prescription (acquisition by effective
possession over a period of time); subjugation or conquest (acquisition of territory by force
of arms); cession (transfer of territory by treaty provision); and accession or accretion
(changes in the shape of territory through the processes of nature). See generally N. HILL,
CLAIMS TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL-LAW AND RELATIONS 146-63 (1945); J. STARKE,
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-64 (6th ed. 1967). Some authorities would add
adjudication as a sixth mode of acquisition. Id. at 157. Adjudication is the determination of
sovereignty by a decision-making body. Id. One author notes that none of these traditionally
recognized modes of territorial acquisition can account for the creation of new states by
revolution or other means. R. JENNINGS, THE AcQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 6-7 (1963).
8. Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the
Law of Territorial Acquisition, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 221, 223 (1974).
9. [I]n the feudal system the acquisition of a certain territory presupposed the
possibility of maintaining it effectively. Under feudal laws, a certain territory was
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centuries raised for the first time the question of whether sovereignty
over newly found territories could be acquired by discovery or by sym-
bolic acts performed in the name of a sovereign state. Although mere
discovery, in the sense of visual apprehension, had never been regarded
as sufficient to establish sovereignty,' 0 it was generally agreed that dis-
covery accompanied by acts of symbolic annexation" created at least an
"inchoate" title to territory which could subsequently be perfected by
occupation. 2
The intense colonial competition among European powers during the
17th and 18th centuries marked a turning point in the evolution of the
principle of discovery-occupation. England, France, and Holland emerg-
ed as world powers and challenged the established colonial supremacy of
Spain and Portugal. Consequently, the principle of symbolic annexation
relied upon by Spain and Portugal to maintain their colonial dominance
was questioned. 13 These new powers, moving into unoccupied regions
from which Spain and Portugal attempted to exclude them, denied the
validity of symbolic annexation, and stressed the necessity of actual
occupation.' 4 By the end of the 18th century, legal scholars generally
agreed that discovery accompanied by symbolic annexation did not con-
stitute sovereignty.' 5 More was required; the claiming state had to prove
acquired only by the fact that its inhabitants swore allegiance, as homines Iigii, to
their future lord. And allegiance presupposed an effective rule over the territory in
question, both within and without.
Von der Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International
Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 448, 448 (1935).
10. Id. at 452. In the forward to his book, Goebel states: "In respect, however, of the
doctrine that the mere discovery of a new land can give rights of sovereignty . . . [t]he
author believes he has demonstrated beyond a doubt that this theory is baseless in law and in
fact .... " J. GOEBEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE FALKLAND ISLANDS, at xii (1927).
II. Symbolic acts of annexation involve placing markers, banners or flags on the land.
Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 452-57.
12. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 461. Controversy has centered on the question
whether, during the age of European colonialism, discovery accompanied by symbolic acts
of annexation constituted a completed act of sovereignty. Von der Heydte maintains that
"the doctrine and practice of [the 19th century] were greatly influenced by a rigid theory
which recognized effective occupation to be . . . the only sufficient title of territorial
sovereignty." Id. at 462. However, three other legal scholars conclude that discovery
accompanied by symbolic acts of possession was sufficient to establish full sovereignty:
A right or title so acquired and established was deemed good against all subsequent
claims set up in opposition thereto unless, perhaps, transferred by conquest or treaty,
relinquished, abandoned, or successfully opposed by continued occupation on the
part of some other state.
A. KELLER, 0. LIssrrZYN & F. MANN, CREATION OF RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH
SYMBOLIc ACTs 1400-1800, at 149 (1938).
13. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 457-58.
14. Id. at 458.
15. Vattel explained the principle as follows:
The law of nations then only acknowledge [sic] the property and sovereignty of a
1978]
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effective occupation.' 6 Although most scholars during this time felt that
effective occupation was necessary to prove sovereignty, it was not until
the early 19th century that states began to put this theory into practice. 1
7
B. THE MODERN PRINCIPLE OF DIscoVERY-OCCUPATION
By the turn of the 20th century, it was well settled that sovereignty over
territory could be acquired only by effective occupation.18 Effective
occupation consisted of two elements: settlement and administration.' 9
Territory over which a state claimed sovereignty had to be placed under
the actual control and administration of the state. A question remained,
however, as to the kind and degree of occupation needed to create a valid
title. In the first half of the 20th century, four important international
cases addressed this issue.
The Island of Palmas arbitration20 arose out of a controversy between
,the United States and the Netherlands over the sovereignty of a small
island near the Phillippines. 2' The United States claimed that the island
had been discovered by Spain, and was under Spanish sovereignty when,
pursuant to the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898,22 the island was
ceded to the United States as part of the Phillippine Archipelago. 2' The
nation over uninhabited countries, of which they shall really, and in fact, take
possession, in which they shall form settlements, or of which they shall make actual
use. In reality, when navigators have met with desert countries, in which those of
other nations have erected some monument to shew [sic] their having taken posses-
sion of them, they have no farther given themselves any pain about that vain
ceremony, than as it proceeded from the regulation of the popes, who divided a
great part of the world between the crowns of Castile and Portugal.
M. DtE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 91 (London 1793).
16. See notes 18-43 infra and accompanying text.
17. 1, Part 2 P. FAUCHILt.F, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL. PuBI.Qtjn. 688-89 (1925);
von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 462. For a discussion of the principle of effective
occupation and its manifestations during the 19th century, see G. SMEDAL, ACQUISITION Of."
SOVFREIGNTY OVER POLAR AREAS 18-24 (1931).
18. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNAlIONAL LAW 557 (8th ed. 1955).
19. Id. Settlement is the establishment on the territory of a community capable of
maintaining the authority of the state. Administration is the maintenance of a responsible
authority which exercises governing functions. Id. at 557-58.
20. Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1949).
21. The dispute was referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague by .1
compromis signed in Washington on January 23, 1925. The decision was to be rendered by a
single arbitrator, and for this purpose the parties chose Max Huber, member of the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration. It was agreed that the award should be final. Id. at 83, R. Int'l
Arb. Awards at 831.
22. Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, United States-Spain, 30 Stat. 1754, T.S. No. 343, II
Bevans 615.
23. The Treaty transferred to the United States all rights of sovereignty which Spain may
have possessed in the region covered by the Treaty. The Spanish claim to the territory wa's
based on discovery. As successor to Spain, the United States could only claim those rights
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Netherlands contended that the island had long been under its undisputed
authority. 24 The arbitrator, Max Huber, a member of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, awarded the island to the Netherlands on
the basis of his finding that the Netherlands had exercised a continuous
and peaceful display of authority over the island for a long period of
time.25 The claim of the United States, based on discovery, was re-
jected. 26
Although the arbitrator phrased his explanation of the award in terms
of effective occupation, 27 the decision was not based on this principle as it
has traditionally been understood. Neither Spain, from whom the United
States derived its claim, nor the Netherlands had any "settlement" or
"administration" on the island. The arbitrator, therefore, refrained from
defining effective occupation in these terms and phrased the test as one of
"continuous and peaceful display of territorial sovereignty." 28 The arbi-
trator explained:
Manifestations of teiritorial sovereignty assume, it is true, different
forms, according to conditions of time and place. Although continuous in
which Spain possessed in 1898, the date of cession. Thus, the question became whether the
discovery of the island by Spain was sufficient to establish Spanish sovereignty over the
island. Id. at 96-112, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 843-55.
24. The Netherlands contended that the East India Tea Company established Dutch
sovereignty over the island in the 17th century by contracting with native chieftains. These
contracts were based on the concept that the chieftain received his principality as a fief of
the Dutch state, creating a suzerainty. The Netherlands claimed that the Island of Palmas
was included in these contracts and consequently, in the suzerainty, and that Dutch
sovereignty had been continuously displayed during the past two centuries. Id. at 112-16, R.
Int'l Arb, Awards at 855-59. A further claim was based on the taxation of the peoples of
Palmas by the Dutch authorities. Id. at 124, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 865.
25. Id. at 129, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 869. The arbitrator stated:
It may suffice that such display. . . had already existed as continuous and peaceful
...long enough to enable any Power who might have considered herself as posses-
sing sovereignty over the island, or having a claim to sovereignty, to have, according
to local conditions, a reasonable possibility for ascertaining the existence of a state of
things contrary to her real or alleged rights.
Id. at 127, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 867.
26. "The title of discovery . . . would, under the most favourable and most extensive
interpretation, exist only as an inchoate title, as a claim to establish sovereignty by effective
occupation. An inchoate title however cannot prevail over a definite title founded on
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty." Id. at 128, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 869.
27. Id. at 93, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 839.
28. Id. In fact, however, the display of sovereignty by the Netherlands was not proven to
be continuous. The tribunal admitted that "there is a considerable gap in the documentary
evidence laid before the Tribunal by the Netherlands Government." Id. at 123, R. Int'l Arb.
Awards at 864. The gap was one of 100 years, 1726-1825. The arbitrator acknowledged that
the award was not based on a clear showing of continuous and peaceful sovereignty: "These
facts at least constitute a beginning of establishment of sovereignty by continuous and
peaceful display of state authority, or a commencement of occupation of an island not yet
forming a part of the territory of a state; and such a state of things would create in favour of
the Netherlands an inchoate title for completing the conditions of sovereignty. " Id. at 130,
R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 870 (emphasis added).
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principle, sovereignty cannot be exercised in fact at every moment on
every point of a territory. The intermittence and discontinuity compatible
with the maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as inhabited
or uninhabited regions are involved, or regions enclosed within territories
in which sovereignty is incontestably displayed or again regions accessible
from, for instance, the high seas.2
9
Sovereignty was granted to the nation which had displayed the greater
"[m]anifestations of territorial sovereignty. . . according to conditions
of time and place.- 3 Thus, the Island of Palmas arbitration applied a
lesser standard than the traditional "rigid theory which recognized effec-
tive occupation to be in every possible case the only sufficient title of
territorial sovereignty.- 31
A similar apprQach was taken in two subsequent controversies over
uninhabited territories. A dispute between France and Mexico over a
small island in the East Pacific gave rise in 1931 to the Clipperton Island
arbitration. 32 And in 1933 the Permanent Court of International Justice
rendered its decision in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland,33 resolv-
ing a controversy between Norway and Denmark over the sovereignty of
Eastern-.Greenland. 34 Neither of these cases turned upon effective occu-
pation. Rather, like the award in the Island of Palmas arbitration, each
decision was based on those acts of sovereignty considered by the tribu-
nal to be sufficient under the peculiar circumstances of the case.35
29. Id. at 94, R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 840.
30. Id.
3 1. Von der Hevdte, supra note 9, at 462.
32. Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932). The dispute
between France and Mexico over Clipperton Island was submitted to the King of Italy for
arbitration. The island was awarded to France on the basis that in 1858 a French navy
lieutenant had performed the symbolic act of "proclaim[ing] and declar[ing] that the
sovereignty of the said island beginning from that date belonged in perpetuity to His Majesty
the Emperor Napoleon III ... " Id. at 391. Further facts offered by France to support her
claim included approval by the Emperor of a concession for the exploitation of guano beds
on the island seven months before the proclamation of sovereignty and further acts of
surveillance in the area by the French Navy. Mexico, as the successor to Spain, based its
claim on Spanish discovery of the island. Id. at 392-93.
33. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A./B., No. 53.
34. Norway claimed that Eastern Greenland was an uninhabited territory, and thus
subject to Norwegian occupation and sovereignty. Denmark claimed the territory on the
ground that her sovereignty, concentrated on the west coast of the island, extended to the
entire island and that Norway had recognized such sovereignty by treaty and diplomacy.
The Court established a two-fold requirement for the acquisition of territory: "the intention
and will to act as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority." Id. at
45-46. Applying these two principles, the Court rendered its decision in favor of Denmark. A
discussion of this case can be found in Cheng, supra note 8.
35. In the Clipperton Island arbitration, the tribunal reasoned that actual occupation was
but one means of acquiring territory, and that where the area was uninhabited, resort to
actual occupaiion might be unnecessary:
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In 1953 the International Court of Justice decided the Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case,36 which stemmed from a controversy between France and
Great Britain over the sovereignty of two groups of inhabited islets in the
English Channel. This case was unique since Great Britain had exercised
actual administrative, judicial, and legislative control over the islands.37
In awarding the islands to Great Britain, the Court stated that "[t]he
present case does not . . . present the characteristics of a dispute con-
cerning the acquisition of sovereignty over terra nullius,"' 3 8 and that
"[w]hat is of decisive importance. . . is. . .the evidence which relates
directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups." 39 Thus
the court implicitly recognized the principle established in previous cases
that effective occupation of territory need only be as extensive as the
nature of the territory permits.
40
In evaluating the above four cases, two elements must be emphasized.
First, each case involved a controversy between only two parties; the
tribunal was not called upon to decide whether either party had in fact
effectively occupied the territory, but only to determine which of the two
Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from
the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the
absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of
possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby
completed.
Clipperton Island (France v. Mexico), 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 394 (1932). The tribunal found
the French government's symbolic act of annexation a sufficient display of sovereignty to
justify awarding the uninhabited island to France.
Similarly, in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland the award of the territory to Denmark was
not based on effective occupation. Danish authority in Eastern Greenland had never been
extensive. Although the first requirement of the Court's two-fold test, evidencing an intent
to rule, was satisfied by the Danish government's issuance of legislative enactments, there
was no proof of the second requirement, administrative control. Judge Anzilotti in his
dissenting opinion noted:
[I]n the remainder of Greenland there were perhaps laws in force but no authority to
enforce them: in fact-and this is a circumstance as exceptional as it is significant-
no officials had even been appointed competent to decide disputes or to apply and
ensure respect for the law.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.C.I.J., ser. A./B., No. 53, at 83. Pure legisla-
tion, without an effective administration to enforce it, more closely resembles a symbolic
act of annexation than it does an effective occupation.
36. Minquiers and Ecrehos Case, [1953] I.C.J. 47.
37. Id. at 65-66. The Court emphasized those "acts which relate[d] to the exercise of
jurisdiction and local administration and to legislation." Id. at 65. These included instituting
proceedings against those who committed criminal offenses on the Ecrehos, holding in-
quests on corpses found in the Ecrehos, levying taxes on houses or huts built on the islets of
Ecrehos, and requiring public registry of deeds relating to the sale of property on the islets.
Id.
38. Id. at 53.
39. Id. at 57.
40. Judge Carneiro, in his individual opinion, explicitly recognized this principle. See id.
at 85.
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claims was the stronger n.4 A second, closely related factor was the impor-
tance given by the courts to the maintenance of the existing legal order;
that is, the courts' express intention to resolve the dispute in the way least
likely to disrupt the international order.42 With these factors in mind, the
significance of the four cases as regards the principle of discovery-
occupation is that each acknowledges that the requirements for the ac-
quisition of sovereignty may vary according to the nature of the territory.
Sovereignty over uninhabitable territory may be acquired without fully
satisfying the classic conditions of effective occupation. Territories capa-
ble of habitation, or which have in fact been occupied, will require more
in the way of administration or settlement before sovereignty can be
established. A modern definition of the principle of discovery-occupation
must be sufficiently flexible to take these factors into account.
II
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF DISCOVERY-
OCCUPATION TO EMERGING VOLCANIC ISLANDS
Although the principle of discovery-occupation may be well suited to
resolving disputes over newly found territories, its application to newly
forming volcanic islands creates numerous difficulties. The most im-
mediate problem is det*ermining the time at which such islands can be said
to be discoverable or subject to effective occupation. 43 As previously
mentioned, the United States and Japan have each discovered a volcanic
shoal that is expected to develop into an island.' Shoals are not dis-
coverable as that term is understood in international law because they do
41. This factor was relied upon by the Court in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933]
P.C.I.J., ser. A./B., No. 53, at 46.
42. If. . . only one of two conflicting interests is to prevail . . . the interest which
involves the maintenance of a state of things having offered at the critical time to
the inhabitants of the disputed territory and to other States a certain guarantee for
the respect of their rights ought, in doubt, to prevail over an interest which-
supposing it' to be recognized in international law-has not yet received any
concrete form of development.
Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83, 130 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 870 (1949).
43. This question might be stated in terms of the "critical date'-the date after which any
action of the parties can no longer affect the issue of sovereignty. The function of such a
date is to prevent a party from improving its position after a dispute has arisen. Fitzmaurice,
The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-4: Points of Substantive
Law, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 20 (1955-56).
44. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. A shoal is defined as a "submerged ridge,
bank, or bar producing a shoal, consisting of or covered by sand, mud, gravel, or other
unconsolidated material, and rising from the bed of a body of water to near the surface so as
to constitute a danger to surface navigation." AMERICAN GEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, GLOSSARY
OF GEOLOGY 653 (1974).
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not constitute a piece of territory. According to traditional theory, dis-
covery, symbolic annexation, and effective occupation can take place
only after the shoal has become an island. 5 Thus, under the principle of
discovery-occupation, the island would belong by inchoate right, not to
the nation that discovered the developing shoal, but to the nation that first
performed a symbolic act of annexation upon the developing island. 46
An international rule of law which denies to the finder of developing
territory the right to acquire it, while granting that right to the first nation
to perform a symbolic ceremony upon the developed territory, is a rule
not likely to be respected by the world community. Although it can be
argued that the finding nation, if sufficiently interested in acquiring the
territory, should be on hand to appropriate the island once it has arisen,
this argument overlooks the uncertainty as to when volcanic shoals will
emerge as islands. To deploy a ship to watch a volcanic shoal which may
or may not develop into an island is a potentially senseless waste of
economic resources. 47 Furthermore, a conflict may arise if more than one
nation is on hand to "discover and symbolically annex" the island. It is
unlikely that a nation which has discovered a developing shoal will idly sit
by if, once the shoal emerges as an island, another nation is the first to
accomplish the mystical acts leading to sovereignty. 48 By emphasizing
symbolic annexation as a means of acquiring a prior right to territory, and
thus encouraging nations to be in the vicinity of an island when it
emerges, international law may be inviting open conflict, particularly
where the island is of great economic or strategic importance. Such a
theory may in fact jeopardize the peace and security which an interna-
tional legal system should foster.
The award of a newly formed island to the first nation to discover a
developing shoal is likewise riddled with problems. The first difficulty is
ascertaining which nation in fact discovered the developing shoal. Con-
ceivably, nations could agree to openly declare the discovery of newly
forming territory and their intent to acquire it. Delineating what consti-
45. A new series of problems will arise if nations are allowed to appropriate volcanic
shoals. For example, how close to the surface must the shoal be before it can be acquired?
What happens if the volcanic activity ceases and no island develops?
46. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
47. It has been reported that Japan is engaging in si~ch observation. "Since the possibility
has increased that the shoals will become islands, the Japanese maritime agency has decided
to have [a] patrol ship sail near the shoal while engaged in its regular duty of patrolling
against sea accidents. The ship will be on hand to 'discover' the new islands." Cleveland
Plain Dealer, supra note 2.
48. For example, how likely is it that a nation would calmly sit by if another state claimed
discovery of a developing volcanic island located in the middle of its traditional fishing
grounds? Would a free western nation permit a communist state to "discover" an island
close to its shores?
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tutes newly forming territory, however, would be a nearly impossible
task. For example, would the discovery of a fault in the ocean floor and
the prediction of volcanic activity from the fault constitute discovery if,
at some point in the future, volcanic activity from the fault created
islands? Clearly sovereignty over territory should not depend on which
nation's scientists are the first to detect the possible formation of new
territories.
Moreover, a policy of scientific discovery would benefit only those
nations with technology sufficiently advanced to enable them to engage in
extensive geologic investigations, and would ignore the potentially per-
suasive claims of less developed nations. Strict adherence to a principle
of discovery would fail to take into account such complicating factors as
the proximity of the territory to hostile nations, the likelihood that the
claiming nation will develop the territory, and the claiming nation's need
for the territory to maintain its economic viability.
A further problem in awarding a volcanic island to the first nation to
discover a developing shoal is that mere discovery does not demonstrate a
nation's intent or desire to establish sovereignty over the territory. 49
Developing islands discovered by a nation having no intention of exercis-
ing sovereignty could remain in a politically aggravating state of limbo for
a substantial length of time.50 Thus the principle of discovery is too
arbitrary to provide a lasting solution to international territorial disoutes.
Even if the problems of discovery could be overcome, there remain the
possible difficulties of effective occupation. Traditional theory maintains
that an inchoate right to territory can be perfected only if followed by an
effective occupation.5 As previously noted, the elements of occupation
differ according to the nature of the territory in question. 2 Moreover,
since different nations may value the same uninhabited volcanic island
for different ultimate uses-some may view the island as a future military
base while others foresee economic development-effective occupation
49. See notes 9-39 supra and accompanying text.
50. This problem is of equal concern if one assumes a symbolic act of annexation gives a
nation an "inchoate right" to acquire territory. As already noted, the concept of "inchoate
right" is not confined to the passage of a specified period of time but merely to a "rea-
sonable" time. Von der Heydte, supra note 9, at 460.
51. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
52. See notes 18-43 supra and accompanying text. For example, suppose a small volcanic
island with no economic value emerges close to a larger island possessed by the United
States and utilized as a nuclear submarine base. The United States "discovers" the island
and performs a symbolic act of annexation. The only value of the island to the United States
is strategic; that is, possession of the island prevents hostile nations from acquiring the
island and monitoring United States activities at the submarine base. If the island has no
economic value, can it be said that the United States has failed to effectively occupy the
island if it performs no other activities on the island? The ambiguity surrounding the
doctrine of effective occupation presents no clear answer to this question.
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will undoubtedly mean different things to different nations. A nation
could fulfill the traditional requirements of effective occupation, settle-
ment and administration, by placing several people on the island and
passing a legislative act appointing a governor to rule over the island.
Such a token gesture in the midst of controversy, however, would amount
to little more than a symbolic act of annexation, and would involve the
problems of symbolic annexation discussed above. Realistically, disputes
over volcanic islands will most often arise immediately upon emergence
of the islands-before any truly effective occupation is possible. Thus,
the traditional yardstick of territorial acquisition, effective occupation,
has little relevance to the problems created by developing volcanic
islands.
•III
RECOMMENDATIONS
The elusiveness of the principle of discovery-occupation recommends
that conflicting claims to developing volcanic islands be evaluated not
according to strict legal criteria, but according to economic, strategic, and
geographical considerations. Although the aspects of these so-called non-
legal factors are multifarious,5 3 several guidelines can be recommended.
In setting forth standards by which territorial disputes are to be resolved,
it is important that no one nation or group of nations be favored. If such
standards are to receive wide acceptance, it is important that they apply
equitably to both Third World countries and to recognized world powers.
Four factors should be weighed in settling disputes: (1) the claiming
nations' desire for the island to maintain defensive national security; (2)
the past economic activity of the claiming nations in the vicinity of the
developing island; (3) the need of the claiming nations for the economic
resources of the island; and (4) the proximity of the island to the claiming
nations.
Considerations of a strategic nature depend for their strength upon
conditions of international relations that are widely deplored. But as long
as nations feel insecure against attack, this factor must be weighed. In
evaluating strategic claims, a distinction must be made between those
claims seeking advantages of an offensive nature, and those claims of-
fered for defensive purposes.5 4 Claims to territory adaptable to offensive
53. For a detailed study of the economic, strategic, historical, geographical, and ethnic
claims to territory, see N. HILL, supra note 7, at 35-142.
54. It is not always easy to distinguish between offensive and defensive strategic ac-
tivities. For example, during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union claimed that it was
supplying only defensive missiles to Cuba. Even if this were true there is little doubt that the
United States still would have felt threatened by the establishment of these missile bases so
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warfare are objectionable since they pose a greater risk of disrupting the
international balance of power. Claims based on defensive considera-
tions, on the other hand, tend to preserve international peace. Strategic
considerations should focus on which of the disputant nations presents a
stronger defensive claim to the island. Maintenance of defensive national
security, and not opportunity to obtain offensive advantage, should be
the test.55
Another important factor is the extent of past economic activity near
the developing island. Consideration of past economic activity would
serve to preserve the stability of the claimant nations by granting to one
of them sovereignty over an area already utilized by it for economic
purposes. Furthermore, such a consideration would maintain what might
be termed "historic rights" 56 to an area of the high seas. If a nation has
traditionally carried on fishing activities in an area of international wa-
ters, that nation can be said to have acquired historic rights based on a
time-honored practice. The notion of historic rights is important primarily
because it serves to maintain the established expectations of the interna-
tional community. By granting sovereignty over an emerging island to a
nation which is already recognized as exercising rights over an area of
international waters, the friction which might be caused by denying those
rights will be avoided.
An equally important economic consideration is the need of the claim-
ant nation for the resources of the volcanic island. It has been estimated
that 30 to 45 percent of the oil in the ocean seabeds lies beyond the
continental shelves. 57 Deep sea nodules containing copper, manganese,
cobalt, and nickel cover thousands of square miles of ocean bottom and
represent an inestimable source of wealth.58 If nations continue to follow
the current trend of extending territorial waters to the 200 mile limit, and
if this limit applies to islands, 59 emerging volcanic islands will represent a
potential source of great mineral wealth.
close to its shores. Furthermore, the development of a new defensive weapon can upset the
balance of power as easily as the invention of new offensive weaponry. Although on
occasion only a fine line exists between offensive and defensive use, the importance of
maintaining the present balance of power requires that such a distinction be made.
55. See generally N. HILL, supra note 7, at 65-70, 168-69.
56. See Y. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 241-334 (1965).
57. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 60, col. 1.
58. Id. at 61, col. 2.
59. The question of whether the 200 mile limit will apply equally to islands has not yet
been resolved. According to the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,
art. 10(l), [19581 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, the territorial sea of an island is
measured in the same manner as that of any other land mass. For a discussion of the
difficulties of applying the 200 mile limit to islands, see SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON GEOGRAPH-
ICAL DISADVANTAGE, THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA,
COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL FOR ACCOMMODATION OF GEOGRAPHICALLY DISADVANTAGED
COUNTRIES, reprinted in 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 181 (1975-76).
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A nation's need for the economic resources of an island is important for
two reasons. First, simple equity would seem to demand that a nation in
need of natural resources be accorded some preference. A greater distri-
bution of wealth throughout the world community would serve to elimi-
nate much economically based dissension. Second, because considera-
tion of the extent of economic activity which a nation has carried on at the
geographical location of an emerging island is likely to favor the tech-
nologically advanced world powers, consideration of a claimant nation's
needs for the mineral resources of an island is likely to balance out the
former consideration by favoring Third World nations. World powers
such as the United States, Russia, and Japan, with large fishing and
commercial shipping fleets, would most often benefit from a con-
sideration of past economic activity. Third World nations, on the other
hand, would more likely benefit from a determination of the need a nation
has for the economic resources of a volcanic island. Such a balancing of
interests is essential if any set of standards for the resolution of territorial
disputes is to receive international acceptance. 60
Although geographical proximity, or contiguity, has not received wide
acceptance in international law as a principle establishing ipso jure
sovereignty in favor of a particular state, it is an important consideration
when the question is which among claimant nations is to be awarded
sovereignty over a developing volcanic island.6 Geographical proximity
is important first because of its relation to strategic and economic claims.
An island located close to a claimant nation is more likely to be wanted
for defensive strategic purposes than for offensive advantage, and the
resources of an island located proximate to a nation are more easily and
economically developed. But aside from its relation to strategic and
economic claims, geographical proximity is important from the perspec-
tive of the developing island itself. If volcanic islands are someday to be
inhabited, it is necessary that they offer a level of security and social and
60. Another potential economic consideration is the ability of a nation to develop the
resources of a volcanic island. The major drawback of this factor is that it would almost
always favor nations with highly developed technology over Third World nations. However,
since an underdeveloped nation has the ability to grant contractual rights to develop the
resources, there is no danger that such resources will be wasted. Thus a nation's ability to
develop the resources should not be weighed heavily.
61. The principle of contiguity, in regard to islands, may not be out of place when it
is a question of allotting them to one State rather than another, either by agreement
between the Parties, or by a decision not necessarily based on law; but as a rule
establishing ipso jure the presumption of sovereignty in favour of a particular
State, this principle would be in conflict with what has been said as to territorial
sovereignty and as to the necessary relation between the right to exclude other
States from a region and the duty to display therein the activities of a State.
Island of Palmas (United States v. Netherlands), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 83, 111 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1928), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 854-55 (1949).
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cultural l enefits that compare favorably with those offered in other parts
of the world. From a security standpoint, it would be important to the
population of an island not to be located amidst hostile powers. Geo-
graphical proximity to a claimant nation would provide an island with a
degree of security not available if the island were under the sovereignty of
a distant nation. From the standpoint of social and cultural benefits, it
would be essential for the population of an island to be close to friendly
populations, so that in times of great need or tragedy assistance could be
rendered promptly. And finally, it would be important for the island to be
in a position where contact with surrounding populations would be both
free and comfortable.
Although the above considerations do not exhaust the relevant criteria,
they do represent a starting point for the development of an impartial set
of standards for the intelligent resolution of territorial disputes over
volcanic islands. In this regard, emerging volcanic islands present a
situation unique in the law of territorial acquisition. Traditionally, the
principle of discovery-occupation worked to maintain the international
legal order. Because this principle recognized territory as belonging to the
nation that occupied it, the principle served to maintain the international
status quo by discouraging nations from asserting sovereignty over in-
habited territories. With regard to emerging volcanic islands, however,
previous occupation is impossible. A strict application of the discovery-
occupation principle would arbitrarily grant sovereignty to the first nation
to appropriate the island, while ignoring claims of a strategic, economic,
or geographical nature that might be vital to the economic and security
interests of the community of nations. Absent the problem of previous
occupation, these nonlegal considerations are clearly more likely to pro-
vide a lasting solution conducive to the maintenance of international
order.
One possible drawback to founding sovereignty on economic, strategic,
and geographical considerations is that such criteria are less visible than
the traditional standard of occupation. As a result, disputes over
sovereignty may be more likely under the proposed scheme. Therefore,
procedures for the prompt resolution of such conflicts must be devel-
oped.
Because the question of sovereignty over developing volcanic islands is
a relatively new one, it is doubtful that there would be much resistance to
the establishment of such a procedure. However, if nations remain inac-
tive until serious conflicts arise, the possibility of setting up a mechanism
to resolve disputes will be greatly reduced. Thus, haste is recommended.
As regards the form by which such a procedure should be established, the
most effective means would be the use of bilateral treaties. These treaties
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have the advantage of precision and of a functionally more efficient
enforcement machinery. A more encompassing alternative would be the
use of multilateral treaties. Although multilateral treaties have suffered in
the past from great difficulties of enforcement, they do provide a measure
of control over signatory nations simply because of the international
censure which follows a nation's failure to honor its commitments. 62
Conflicts between signatory nations to a bilateral treaty should be
submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed of representatives from the
disputant countries and from a third neutral country upon which the
signatories have agreed. As regards multilateral treaties, disputes should
be submitted to the International Court of Justice. Although the
Court has become increasingly inactive in recent years, the basic problem
has been the reluctance of nations to refer international disputes to the
Court.63 The Court, as a tribunal accustomed to resolving international
disputes, would be the most effective arbiter of conflicting claims of
sovereignty. Finally, submission of conflicting claims for resolution by
the International Court of Justice would serve to facilitate the devel-
opment of a uniform body of international law regarding sovereignty over
developing territories.
CONCLUSION
In its present state, the international law of territorial acquisition is
inadequate to deal with conflicting claims to newly forming volcanic
islands. In a world where a delicate balance of power must be maintained,
the concepts of discovery, symbolic annexation, and effective occupation
have little relevance to the sensitive question of which nation is to acquire
sovereignty over valuable territory. Strategic, economic, and geograph-
ical considerations are far more likely to provide a lasting solution condu-
cive to the maintenance of international peace and order. It is essential
that nations establish a procedure capable of resolving conflicting claims
before actual disputes develop. The possibilities of developing intelligent
standards and a procedure to implement the standards are not remote; the
danger lies in the international legal system remaining inactive until seri-
ous conflicts arise.
Mark Dingley
62. Because nonsignatory nations are not bound by such treaties, a procedure established
by a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations might prove an effective
alternative. Although such resolutions are only recommendations and are not legally binding
on member states, they do possess a persuasive effect. See Advisory Opinion on Voting
Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning the Territory of
South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. 67, 118-19.
63. Rogers, The Rule of Law and the Settlement of International Disputes, 64 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PRoc. 285, 286 (1970).
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